OPEN ARCHITECTURE AND R&D INCENTIVES
研究了在位企业通过开放架构放弃技术产权如何影响研发竞争和社会福利，发现开放架构可能使低效技术成为市场标准，抑制更高效技术的进入。
In open systems, firms give up their property rights to technologies and permit other companies to use these technologies. We ask how an incumbent's architecture choice affects social welfare by altering R&D competition among firms. More specifically, we ask whether an incumbent, by adopting an open system, can establish its socially inefficient technology as the market standard, while an entrant is developing a more efficient technology. It is shown that an incumbent has an incentive to preempt an entrant's competing technology by choosing an open system, but that the open system might result in a premature market standard.