Real Activities Manipulation and Auditors' Client-Retention Decisions
研究发现，客户通过真实活动操纵（除过度生产外）会增加审计师辞职的可能性，审计师对客户为达到盈余基准而进行的操纵尤为敏感，且被辞职的客户往往更激进地操纵并转向小型审计师。
ABSTRACT In this study, we examine the effect of clients' real activities manipulation (RAM) on auditors' client-retention decisions. We find that, with the exception of RAM through overproduction, clients' opportunistic operating decisions are positively associated with the likelihood of auditor resignations. We also provide evidence that auditors are especially sensitive to clients' RAM to just meet or beat earnings benchmarks in their client-retention decisions. In addition, we find that clients whose auditors resign from engagements tend to hire smaller auditors and these clients engage in RAM more aggressively. Our additional analysis shows that, with the exception of RAM through overproduction, clients' abnormal operating decisions are significantly associated with litigation risk against auditors. Overall, our evidence suggests that auditors drop clients with aggressive RAM to avoid excessive risk. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.