A NEW CINDERELLA STORY: JOINT VENTURES AND THE PROPERTY RIGHTS THEORY OF THE FIRM
综述了20多篇关于在不完全契约下合资企业最优性的经济学论文，分析了放松标准假设后合资企业优于独资企业的条件，为经济学和管理学研究者提供了系统化的理论梳理。
Abstract Joint ventures (JVs) are a common form of inter‐firm collaboration and, unsurprisingly, the subject of a vast literature, extending from economics to management and business studies. Issues of control are central to the definition of JVs, and this naturally calls for an interpretation in the context of the property rights theory (PRT) of the firm. In a series of seminal papers, Grossman, Hart and Moore (GHM) offer a rigorous framework to predict the allocation of control rights. Notably, under the standard assumptions of GHM, JVs are suboptimal. However, JVs are not suboptimal in more general settings where a number of the original framework's assumptions are relaxed. In the context of PRT, this paper surveys more than 20 contributions that address the optimality of JVs under contract incompleteness. The surveyed papers question the assumptions of GHM and reveal the circumstances in which JVs outperform sole ownership. Although contributions are scattered over time and bibliographical sources, we believe sufficient material has accumulated over 25 years of economic modelling to encourage some systematization. The discussion is organized in an intuitive and non‐technical way; in particular, effort is devoted to analysing each paper in detail and providing a unified framework.