Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
将显示原理扩展到机制设计者不能完全承诺机制结果的情形，证明在直接机制下真实显示是代理人的最优策略，但可能不是以概率1采用，为研究不完全承诺问题提供了基本工具。
This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may not use this strategy with probability one. Our results apply to contracting problems between a principal and a single agent. By reducing such problems to well-defined programming problems they provide a basic tool for studying imperfect commitment.