Privatization and the Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy
研究国际金融市场、私有化与战略贸易政策之间的相互依赖关系，发现所有权结构通过影响私人代理的游说激励来影响贸易政策，私有化通过扩大个人分散化范围对国内外政府的贸易政策产生重要影响。
This article considers the interdependence between international financial markets, privatization, and strategic trade policies. We describe an economy where portfolio allocations are chosen by risk‐averse agents who rationally forecast future trade policies. Assuming a government responsive to the policy preferences of voters, we show that ownership structure affects trade policy through the incentives for lobbying by private agents. Portfolios and trade policy are thus jointly determined in political‐economic equilibrium. Privatization of state‐owned industry exerts an important influence over the trade policies chosen by domestic and foreign governments by expanding the scope for individual diversification.