Corporate Governance Propagation through Overlapping Directors
研究公司治理实践如何通过董事兼任网络在企业间传播，发现企业倾向于选择治理相似的董事，但匹配不完美导致董事带来其他公司的做法，最终使治理趋同。
How are governance practices propagated across firms? This article proposes, and empirically verifies, that observed governance practices are partly the outcome of network effects among firms with common directors. While firms attempt to select directors whose other directorships are at firms with similar governance practices ("familiarity effect"), this matching of governance practices is imperfect because other factors also affect the director choice. This generates an "influence effect" as directors acquainted with different practices at other firms influence the firm's governance to move toward the practices of those other firms. These network effects cause governance practices to converge. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.