Bank-Specific Default Risk in the Pricing of Bank Note Discounts
研究了美国内战前银行票据的贴现定价，发现二级市场通过准确反映每家银行的违约风险来降低投资者的损失，解释了为何高损失年份票据仍能广泛流通。
Bank notes were the largest component of the antebellum money supply despite losses as high as 5 percent in some years. Using a comprehensive bank-level panel of note discounts in New York City and Philadelphia, I explain this contradiction by showing that the secondary market reduced losses by accurately discounting notes based on their individual risk of default. Note discounts were almost exclusively sensitive to those factors which increased a bank's probability of default: specie suspensions, falling bond prices, and undiversified portfolios. Thus, by accounting for a bank's composition and environment, the market protected noteholders and allowed notes to circulate throughout the economy.