Price‐increasing competition
研究产品差异化离散选择模型中，双寡头定价可能高于垄断价格的条件，分析市场份额效应与价格敏感效应的相对强弱，为提价竞争提供精确条件。
In a discrete choice model of product differentiation, the symmetric duopoly price may be lower than, equal to, or higher than the single‐product monopoly price. Whereas the market share effect encourages a duopolist to charge less than the monopoly price because a duopolist serves fewer consumers, the price sensitivity effect motivates a higher price when more consumer choice steepens the firm's demand curve. The joint distribution of consumer values for the two conceivable products determines the relative strength of these effects. The analysis provides precise conditions for price‐increasing competition and reveals that it is unexceptional from a theoretical perspective.