Breaking the Bounds of Organization in Strategic Decision Making
通过四个案例研究，分析了高层管理者在决策过程中的权力运作，区分了受组织规则约束的有限决策和相对自由的无限决策，并揭示了决策变得无限的四种方式。
This paper examines the exercise of power in organizational decision making. Four case studies are presented in the text and are analyzed in terms of the power plays of senior managers who were centrally involved in the decision-making process. In particular, the analysis distinguishes between bounded and unbounded decisions. In the former case the power plays of interests are constrained by preestablished organizational rules and procedures, while in the latter case unbounded decisions are relatively free from such organizational parameters and allow actors to exercise power selectively to secure their own interests. The data suggest that decisions may become unbounded in four ways: through unaccustomed forms of data, individual conflict, and novel topics for decision and where the problem is initiated from an unexpected or unusual source. Where decisions become unbounded the data suggest that those actors who are existing power holders through the control of critical contingencies are also able to take advantage of the rules and procedures of the institution to further their own interests.