Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids
建立了一个共同价值环境下的社会学习模型，研究信息级联和羊群效应如何与赢家诅咒结合，并比较了顺序出价与英式拍卖对卖方收入的影响。
We present a model of social learning in an environment with common values where informational cascades and herding arise in combination with the winner's curse. A seller of an object sequentially obtains bids from potential buyers. We characterize three classes of equilibria that differ widely in their information aggregation properties and in the size of the rent the seller captures from the buyers. We compare the procedure of sequentially soliciting bids from the buyers to conducting an English auction for the object in terms of maximization of seller's revenue and demonstrate the superiority of the former.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, D83.