Self‐fulfilling Currency Crises and Central Bank Independence
基于巴罗-戈登规则与相机抉择模型，研究固定汇率制下自我实现的货币危机，发现危机中失业率上升、规则可信度下降，但决策者声誉反而改善，且央行独立无法阻止危机甚至可能增加成本。
We develop a model of a fixed exchange rate peg arrangement derived from the Barro–Gordon model of rules versus discretion. It is shown that the fixed peg is vulnerable to self‐fulfilling currency crises in which the unemployment rate increases, the credibility of the rule decreases, but, paradoxically, the reputation of the policy‐maker improves. Delegating monetary policy to an independent central banker does not prevent this type of crisis from arising, and can even make it more costly.