Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition
证明，当消费者面临安装成本时，新产品垄断者可能从（延迟的）竞争中获益，因为安装成本造成动态一致性问题，而事前承诺引入竞争可提高利润。
We show that a new product monopolist may benefit from (delayed) competition if consumers incur setup costs. Setup costs create a dynamic consistency problem: the monopolist cannot guarantee low future prices once customers have incurred those costs. We show that, if customers anticipate this problem, the monopolist's profits can be improved through ex ante commitment to competition in the post-adoption market, if setup costs are large. If setup costs are small, the monopolist can typically achieve the same level of profits without price commitment as with.