Incentive Effects of Stock and Option Holdings of Target and Acquirer CEOs
研究发现，CEO持股流动性受限程度越高，公司越可能成为收购方或被收购方；在已完成收购中，目标CEO流动性折扣越高，接受溢价越低、阻力越小，收购方CEO持股越高则支付溢价越高、交易更快。
ABSTRACT Acquisitions enable target chief executive officers (CEOs) to remove liquidity restrictions on stock and option holdings and diminish the illiquidity discount. Acquisitions also enable acquirer CEOs to improve the long‐term value of overvalued holdings. Examining all firms during 1993 to 2001, we show that CEOs with higher holdings (illiquidity discount) are more likely to make acquisitions (get acquired). Further, in 250 completed acquisitions, target CEOs with a higher illiquidity discount accept a lower premium, offer less resistance, and more often leave after acquisition. Similarly, acquirer CEOs with higher holdings pay a higher premium, expedite the process, and make diversifying acquisitions using stock payment.