Nondiversification Traps in Catastrophe Insurance Markets
构建了一个巨灾风险市场模型，解释为何保险公司即使有足够市场容量实现风险分散，仍可能选择不提供巨灾保险或不参与再保险市场，形成“非分散化陷阱”。
We develop a model for markets for catastrophic risk. The model explains why insurance providers may choose not to offer insurance for catastrophic risks and not to participate in reinsurance markets, even though there is a large enough market capacity to reach full risk sharing through diversification in a reinsurance market. This is a “nondiversification trap.” We show that nondiversification traps may arise when risk distributions have heavy left tails and insurance providers have limited liability. When they are present, there may be a coordination role for a centralized agency to ensure that risk sharing takes place.