Screening, Market Signalling, and Capital Structure Theory
构建了一个均衡模型，通过结合信号传递和成本筛选机制，解决产品质量的信息不对称问题，并应用于债券市场，分析企业债务权益比和债务期限结构如何向潜在股东传递盈利信息。
ABSTRACT This paper develops an equilibrium model in which informational asymmetries about the qualities of products offered for sale are resolved through a mechanism which combines the signalling and costly screening approaches. The model is developed in the context of a capital market setting in which bondholders produce costly information about a firm's a priori imperfectly known earnings distribution and use this information in specifying a bond valuation schedule to the firm. Given this schedule, the firm's optimal choices of debt‐equity ratio and debt maturity structure subsequently signal to prospective shareholders the relevant parameters of the firm's earnings distribution.