Rational Ignorance versus Rational Irrationality
建立了一个‘理性非理性’模型，解释政治和宗教信仰为何不仅信息匮乏，而且存在系统性偏差和高确定性。非理性被当作正常商品消费，其代价在政治中几乎为零，但私人成本与社会成本不一致时会导致效率损失。
The paper presents a model of ‘rational irrationality’ to explain why political and religious beliefs are marked not only by low information (as the notion of rational ignorance highlights), but also by systematic bias and high certainty. Being irrational – i.e., deviating from rational expectations – is modeled as normal good. The reason that irrationality in politics and religion is so pronounced is that the private repercussions of error are virtually nonexistant. The consumption of irrationality can be efficient, but it will usually not be when the private and the social cost of irrationality differ – for example, in elections.