Position Auctions with Consumer Search
研究了广告商竞拍搜索引擎赞助链接位置的模型，将位置价值内生化为消费者理性推断企业质量并最优搜索的结果，分析了消费者搜索策略、均衡竞价及拍卖福利，讨论了保留价等设计问题。
This article examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about firm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benefits of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.