Modeling the Change of Paradigm: Non-Bayesian Reactions to Unexpected News
针对贝叶斯规则无法处理零概率事件且常被实证违背的问题，本文提出假设检验模型作为替代更新规则，并应用于博弈论中的均衡精炼。
Bayes' rule has two well-known limitations: 1) it does not model the reaction to zero-probability events; 2) a sizable empirical evidence documents systematic violations of it. We characterize axiomatically an alternative updating rule, the Hypothesis Testing model. According to it, the agent follows Bayes' rule if she receives information to which she assigned a probability above a threshold. Otherwise, she looks at a prior over priors, updates it using Bayes' rule for second-order priors, and chooses the prior to which the updated prior over priors assigns the highest likelihood. We also present an application to equilibrium refinement in game theory.