Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans
研究银团贷款中信息不对称如何影响贷款结构，发现当借款人需要更严格监督时，牵头行保留更大份额并形成更集中的银团；当信息不对称严重时，参与行与借款人在地理和关系上更接近。
ABSTRACT I empirically explore the syndicated loan market, with an emphasis on how information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers influences syndicate structure and on which lenders become syndicate members. Consistent with moral hazard in monitoring, the lead bank retains a larger share of the loan and forms a more concentrated syndicate when the borrower requires more intense monitoring and due diligence. When information asymmetry between the borrower and lenders is potentially severe, participant lenders are closer to the borrower, both geographically and in terms of previous lending relationships. Lead bank and borrower reputation mitigates, but does not eliminate information asymmetry problems.