Political Intervention in Debt Contracts
构建了一个农业经济的动态一般均衡模型，其中贫穷农民向富裕农民借款，通过投票决定是否实施债务暂停，分析政治干预对事前和事后效率的影响。
This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of an agricultural economy in which poor farmers borrow from rich farmers. Because output is stochastic (we allow for idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks), there may be default ex post. We compare equilibria with and without political intervention. Intervention takes the form of a moratorium and is decided by voting. When bad economic shocks are highly likely, state-contingent debt moratoria always improve ex post efficiency and may also improve ex ante efficiency. Moreover, the threat of moratoria enhances efficiency. When adverse macro shocks are unlikely, state-contingent moratoria always improve ex ante welfare by completing incomplete debt contracts.