International Cross‐Listing, Firm Performance, and Top Management Turnover: A Test of the Bonding Hypothesis
检验了美国投资者保护能否改善交叉上市公司的治理，发现来自弱保护制度的企业在美主要交易所上市后，更可能解雇业绩差的CEO，而无需严格保护要求的上市方式则无此效果。
ABSTRACT We examine a primary outcome of corporate governance, namely, the ability to identify and terminate poorly performing CEOs, to test the effectiveness of U.S. investor protections in improving the corporate governance of cross‐listed firms. We find that firms from weak investor protection regimes that are cross‐listed on a major U.S. Exchange are more likely to terminate poorly performing CEOs than non‐cross‐listed firms. Cross‐listings on exchanges that do not require the adoption of stringent investor protections (OTC, private placements, and London listings) are not associated with a higher propensity to remove poorly performing CEOs.