Friend or Foe? Cooperation and Learning in High-Stakes Games
利用电视游戏节目数据，研究人们为何在一次性博弈中违背短期利益而合作，发现条件性合作偏好依赖于对对手合作倾向的识别，且可观察特征影响合作结果。
Why do people frequently cooperate in defiance of their immediate incentives? One explanation is that individuals are conditionally cooperative. As an explanation of behavior in one-shot settings, such preferences require individuals to be able to discern their opponents' preferences. Using data from a television game show, we provide evidence about how individuals implement conditionally cooperative preferences. We show that contestants forgo large sums of money to be cooperative; they cooperate at heightened levels when their opponents are predictably cooperative; and they fare worse when their observable characteristics predict less cooperation because opponents avoid cooperating with them. © 2010 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.