Pure Public Goods versus Commons: Benefit-Cost Duality
利用收益-成本对偶性区分纯公共品和公共池塘资源问题，指出两者虽博弈形式相同，但在纳什均衡与帕累托最优的相对位置、剥削假说形式及选择性激励或惩罚需求上存在差异。
<i>This paper utilizes benefit-cost duality to differentiate the problems associated with a pure public good from the problems associated with a commons. For the public good scenario, contributors’ benefits are public or available to all, while provision costs impact only the contributor. In a commons, crowding costs are public, while benefits affect only the user. Although both problems possess the same game form for their canonical representations, collective-action implications differ: for example, the relative positions of the Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimum, the form of the exploitation hypothesis, and the need for selective incentives or punishments.</i>