Share Repurchases and Pay‐Performance Sensitivity of Employee Compensation Contracts
通过模型和实证表明，股票回购提高了员工薪酬对绩效的敏感性，促使员工更努力，推高股价；回购后员工和经理获得的股票期权和股权减少，市场对回购公告反应积极，且员工持股较多时经理更可能发起回购。
ABSTRACT I show that share repurchases increase pay‐performance sensitivity of employee compensation and lead to greater employee effort and higher stock prices. Consistent with the model, I find that after repurchases, employees and managers receive fewer stock option and equity grants, and that the market reacts favorably to repurchase announcements when employees have many unvested stock options. Managers are more likely to initiate share repurchases when employees hold a large stake in the firm. Moreover, since employees are forced to bear more risk in firms that repurchase shares, they exercise their stock options earlier and receive higher compensation.