Deterrence, Reputations, and Competitive Cognition
构建了企业作为可信市场捍卫者的声誉模型，通过MBA学生模拟游戏检验发现，威慑效果仅当攻击方视目标为次要对手时成立，且管理者依据对手过往成功和活动一致性判断其可信度。
This study examines an aspect of competitive interactions that has attracted increasing research attention: the relationship between deterrence and competitive reputations. We build a conceptual model of the antecedents and consequences of a firm's reputation for being a credible defender of its markets. Theory and limited empirical evidence suggests a firm with this reputation should deter competitive attacks against it. We explore how a manager's competitive cognition about her opponents' (1) patterns of activity in the marketplace and (2) previous success can lead her to perceive a competitor as a credible defender. We test the framework using MBA students in a quasi-field setting, the Markstrat2 simulation game. The results of this study suggest that reputation deters attack only when the potential attacker considers the target firm a minor competitor. Managers consider defenders that have previously been successful as credible defenders of their markets. They also weigh consistency of activity relative to industry average in making inferences about credibility. The study indicates that the deterrence-reputation link is more complex than previous theory and evidence might imply, and suggests considerable promise for a psychological approach to examining competitive interactions.