Revisiting the Lemons Market
扩展了竞争性逆向选择模型，允许信息不对称方内部存在不同信息结构，并用二手车市场框架分析均衡福利，发现市场表现随不知情卖家数量变化取决于交易潜在收益和卖家信息平均质量。
This article extends the standard competitive adverse selection model by allowing for qualitatively different information structures of agents on the informed side of the market. Using the stylized framework of the market for used cars, we examine the welfare properties of equilibria under the assumption that a fraction of the sellers remains uninformed about a parameter that is relevant for their own transaction. Whether market performance increases or decreases in the number of uninformed sellers is shown to depend on (1) the potential gains from trade in the market and (2) the average quality of the sellers' information structure.