Bank Reputation, Bank Commitment, and the Effects of Competition in Credit Markets
分析信贷市场竞争如何影响银行在借款人信用恶化时履行贷款承诺的动机，发现竞争可能增强而非削弱银行声誉，且银行数量增加的影响是非单调的。
This article discusses the effects of credit market competition on a bank's incentive to keep its commitment to lend to a borrower when the borrower's credit quality deteriorates. It is shown that, unlike in the borrower's commitment problem to keep borrowing from the same bank in "good" times, the increased competition may strengthen a bank's incentive to keep its commitment. Banks offer loans with commitment to the highest quality borrowers but, when faced with competition from bond markets, they also give these loans to lower quality borrowers. An increase in the number of banks has a non-monotonic effect; new banks reinforce a bank's incentive only if there are a small number of banks.