Experiments on Damage‐Based Ambient Taxes for Nonpoint Source Polluters
通过实验检验了两种信息要求较低的环境税机制，发现无沟通时排放接近社会最优，有沟通时排放偏低但可通过调整税函数实现效率，并分析了污染阈值变化对效率的影响。
Abstract This article presents experimental tests of a linear and a nonlinear ambient tax mechanism that involve modest information requirements for the regulator. When agents are not allowed to communicate, both tax mechanisms result in emission levels that approximate the social optimum. When agents can communicate, emissions are considerably below the optimum, but we show that the tax function can be scaled to achieve social efficiency. Finally, by disaggregating the overall efficiency measure, we show that changing the pollution threshold that triggers the tax increases the inefficiency resulting from variation in agent‐level decisions, but does not affect average emissions.