Asymmetric interactions between foreign and domestic banks: effects on market entry
研究了20世纪80年代初加州银行业放松管制后，外国银行与美国银行进入市场的互动关系，发现外国银行数量与美国银行进入率呈U型关系，而国内银行的存在会阻碍外国银行进入。
Abstract An inverted U‐shaped relationship is thought to exist between the number of firms entrenched in a market and the rate of new entrants. This study examined early and late entry by foreign and U.S. banks into the California market following a deregulation in the banking industry in the early 1980s. The study was designed to elucidate the competitive interactions between foreign and domestic banks. Specifically, what response did the entry of foreign banks elicit from domestic banks and what influence did the entry of domestic banks exert on the evolution of the foreign banks in the market. Data covering the period from 1979 to 1988 demonstrate that the density of foreign banks operating in the market had a U‐shaped relationship with the rate of entry of U.S. banks, supporting the argument that foreign investment can encourage the expansion of domestic banks. Although foreign banks were not an obstacle to domestic bank entries, the presence of domestic banks deterred the entry of foreign banks. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.