Dynamic Merger Review
分析反垄断机构在合并提案内生且随时间出现时，如何制定最优动态政策。研究发现，在特定条件下，完全短视的合并审查政策（仅根据当前市场结构是否降低消费者剩余来决定批准与否）能最大化折现预期消费者剩余。
We analyze the optimal dynamic policy of an antitrust authority toward horizontal mergers when merger proposals are endogenous and occur over time. Approving a currently proposed merger may affect the profitability and welfare effects of potential future mergers, whose characteristics may not yet be known. We identify conditions under which discounted expected consumer surplus is maximized by using a completely myopic merger review policy that approves a merger if and only if it does not lower consumer surplus given the current market structure. We also discuss a number of extensions as well as factors that undermine the optimality of myopic merger review policies.