Designing Optimal Crop Revenue Insurance
研究当赔偿计划依赖于农民的价格和单产时，最优农作物收入保险合同的设计，并指出美国现有合同并非最优，可能需结合收入保险、产量保险、期货和期权。
When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts.