The Dynamics of the Free-Rider Problem in Takeovers
分析收购要约的动态过程，发现若首次收购失败，收购方可再次出价；随着持股增加，出价逐步上升，股东预期更高出价而惜售，迫使收购方支付更高溢价，且出价间隔趋零时预期利润也趋零。
We explore the dynamics of a takeover bid. In contrast to preceding models, if the initial takeover bid is unsuccessful a raider is allowed to make a new tender offer in order to try and secure the remaining shares. Numerical analysis shows that the raider’s tender offer rises over time as he accumulates more shares. The anticipation of a higher tender offer in the future makes shareholders more inclined to hold their shares and forces the raider to offer a higher premium than is predicted by static theories. As the time between tender offers goes to zero, we show analytically that the expected profit from engaging in a takeover goes to zero.