LBOs, Reversions and Implicit Contracts
利用养老金计划终止数据检验杠杆收购的效率理论与转移理论，发现效率理论能解释部分终止事件，但不足以否定转移理论。
ABSTRACT The conventional view of going‐private transactions is that they are designed to enhance the efficiency of the firm (for example, Jensen (1986) ). A starkly different view is that these and other control transactions are motivated to effect transfers from other stakeholders in the firm to equity holders ( Shleifer and Summers (1988) ). This study exploits data describing pension terminations as a way to test these theories. We conclude that the efficiency theory can plausibly explain a substantial number of LBO‐related terminations, but not enough to undermine the transfer theory. More specific predictions from the efflciency theory are needed to structure more exacting tests.