Insecure Property and Technological Backwardness
研究产权不安全时企业采用先进技术的动力，发现产权不安全导致的福利损失远超通常认为的侵占和激励扭曲，即使先进技术免费可得且事后侵占很小，对分配冲突的预期也会造成技术落后。
We consider the incentive to adopt superior technologies when private property is insecure. The welfare costs of insecure property can be substantially greater than those commonly associated with diversion and with the disincentive effect induced by imperfect appropriation of returns. When private property is sufficiently insecure, anticipation of conflict over economic distribution gives rise to technological backwardness, even though (1) superior technologies are readily available at zero cost and (2) the "ex post" diversion of resources might be small. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.