Inequality and Social Discounting
研究利他关联个体经历私人品味冲击的代际模型中稳态不平等，发现若福利函数仅依赖初始代则效率要求贫困化；若赋予未来世代正但递减的福利权重，则消费均值回归且存在稳态分布。
We explore steady-state inequality in an intergenerational model with altruistically linked individuals who experience privately observed taste shocks. When the welfare function depends only on the initial generation, efficiency requires immiseration: inequality grows without bound and everyone’s consumption converges to zero. We study other efficient allocations in which the welfare function values future generations directly, placing a positive but vanishing weight on their welfare. The social discount factor is then higher than the private one, and for any such difference we find that consumption exhibits mean reversion and that a steady-state, cross-sectional distribution for consumption and welfare exists, with no one trapped at misery.