The Impact of Dual Class Structure on Earnings Management Activities
研究发现双重股权结构的公司比单一股权结构的公司更少进行盈余管理；在双重股权公司中，管理层现金流权与盈余管理正相关，投票权则微弱负相关，且两者分离对盈余管理有微弱负面影响；从双重转为单一股权后盈余管理增加。
Abstract: This paper hypothesizes and finds that firms with dual class structure are less likely to engage in earnings management activities than firms with single class structure. The paper also finds that within the sample of firms with dual class structure, earnings management activities are positively associated with managerial cash flow rights, but marginally and negatively associated with managerial voting rights. In addition, the divergence between voting rights and cash flow rights has a marginally negative impact on earnings management. Finally, in a sample of firms switching from dual class structure to single class structure, earnings management activities increase following the switch.