Monopsony in the Low-Wage Labor Market? Evidence from Minimum Nurse Staffing Regulations
通过估计长期护理行业中护士助理的企业层面劳动力供给弹性，直接检验低工资劳动力市场的买方垄断程度，发现新法规下不合规企业无需提高工资即可增加招聘，结果与完全竞争一致但在复杂模型中可能更模糊。
Abstract This paper provides direct evidence on the extent of monopsony power in the low-wage labor market by estimating the firm-level elasticity of labor supply for nurse aides in the long-term care (nursing home) industry. Using exogenous variation in hiring induced by the passage of a state minimum nurse staffing law, I find that facilities initially out of compliance with the new law did not have to raise their wage offers relative to their competitors in order to hire more nurses. While this is consistent with perfect competition in simple monopsony models of the labor market, I discuss how the results may be more ambiguous in more complicated models.