Marriage Institutions and Sibling Competition: Evidence from South Asia*
利用南亚数据，研究包办婚姻如何加剧姐妹间的竞争，发现父母为嫁出多个女儿会降低长女的择偶标准，导致其早婚，进而影响教育、识字率和成年后经济地位。
Abstract Using data from South Asia, this article examines how arranged marriage cultivates rivalry among sisters. During marriage search, parents with multiple daughters reduce the reservation quality for an older daughter’s groom, rushing her marriage to allow sufficient time to marry off her younger sisters. Relative to younger brothers, younger sisters increase a girl’s marriage risk; relative to younger singleton sisters, younger twin sisters have the same effect. These effects intensify in marriage markets with lower sex ratios or greater parental involvement in marriage arrangements. In contrast, older sisters delay a girl’s marriage. Because girls leave school when they marry and face limited earning opportunities when they reach adulthood, the number of sisters has well-being consequences over the life cycle. Younger sisters cause earlier school-leaving, lower literacy, a match to a husband with less education and a less skilled occupation, and (marginally) lower adult economic status. Data from a broader set of countries indicate that these cross-sister pressures on marriage age are common throughout the developing world, although the schooling costs vary by setting.