Glass Ceilings or Sticky Floors? Statistical Discrimination in a Dynamic Model of Hiring and Promotion
通过动态模型证明，即使晋升环节无歧视，若两组工人在平均技能、信号精度或信号机会频率上存在差异，同等技能的工人晋升到高层职位的概率也会不同。
I show that when two groups differ in ("i") their average skill level, ("ii") the precision with which they can signal their skill prior to entering the labour market, and/or ("iii") the frequency with which they have the opportunity to signal their skill prior to entering the labour market, then even if firms become increasingly informed regarding each worker's skill over time, equally skilled workers from different groups will have different likelihoods of making it to top jobs in the economy, even though there is no discrimination when it comes to promotion to these top jobs. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008.