Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optimal Contracting Theories
综述了近年最优契约理论的新发展，说明CEO薪酬的诸多特征（如快速增长、低激励、运气薪酬、期权使用等）在更复杂的理论框架下可以与效率一致，对研究高管薪酬的学者有参考价值。
Abstract Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that executive compensation is set by CEOs themselves rather than boards on behalf of shareholders, since many features of observed pay packages may appear inconsistent with standard optimal contracting theories. However, it may be that simple models do not capture several complexities of real‐life settings. This article surveys recent theories that extend traditional frameworks to incorporate these dimensions, and show that the above features can be fully consistent with efficiency. For example, optimal contracting theories can explain the recent rapid increase in pay, the low level of incentives and their negative scaling with firm size, pay‐for‐luck, the widespread use of options (as opposed to stock), severance pay and debt compensation, and the insensitivity of incentives to risk.