How to Auction a Bottleneck Monopoly When Underhand Vertical Agreements are Possible
研究在港口运营商可能纵向整合或与托运人私下协议时，如何通过Demsetz拍卖并设定最低装卸费下限来提高社会福利，否则拍卖效果不如无监管的瓶颈垄断。
A seaport is awarded in a Demsetz auction to the operator bidding the lowest cargo‐handling fee. The competitive auction is irrelevant if the port operator integrates into shipping and sabotages competitors, thus providing a motive for a ban on vertical integration. The paper shows that such a ban increases welfare even when underhand agreements with shippers are possible. For this result to attain, the auction must be combined with a sufficiently high floor on the cargo‐handling fee that operators can bid in the auction. With no floor, a Demsetz auction is worse than an unregulated bottleneck monopoly.