Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer?
研究了制造商向拥有更优需求预测信息的报童零售商销售时，其预期利润与零售商预测精度的关系，发现制造商仅在零售商预测能力已较好时才受益，否则会受损。
This paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand-forecast information. We show that the manufacturer's expected profit is convex in the retailer's forecasting accuracy: The manufacturer benefits from selling to a better-forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster. If the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities, then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer's forecasting capability improves. More generally, the manufacturer tends to be hurt (benefit) by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative (poor). Finally, the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract.