Crossing Networks and Dealer Markets: Competition and Performance
研究被动交叉网络（买卖双方直接交易）与做市商市场的互动，发现交叉网络存在正外部性（流动性）和负外部性（拥挤），并分析其引入对做市商市场的影响。
This paper studies the interaction between dealer markets and a relatively new form of exchange, passive crossing networks, where buyers and sellers trade directly with one another. We find that the crossing network is characterized by both positive (‘liquidity’) and negative (‘crowding’) externalities, and we analyze the effects of its introduction on the dealer market. Traders who use the dealer market as a ‘market of last resort’ can induce dealers to widen their spread and can lead to more efficient subsequent prices, but traders who only use the crossing network can provide a counterbalancing effect by reducing adverse selection and inventory holding costs.