Rational Inattention Dynamics: Inertia and Delay in Decision-Making
求解了一类动态理性疏忽问题，其中代理人反复获取关于演变状态的有成本信息并选择行动。解类似于动态Logit模型中的选择规则，但偏向于一个不依赖实现状态的最优默认规则。应用该解研究了沉没成本谬误、行动惯性导致的冲击滞后调整以及决策中准确性与时滞的权衡。
We solve a general class of dynamic rational-inattention problems in which an agent repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions. The solution resembles the choice rule in a dynamic logit model, but it is biased towards an optimal default rule that does not depend on the realized state. We apply the general solution to the study of (i) the sunk-cost fallacy; (ii) inertia in actions leading to lagged adjustments to shocks; and (iii) the tradeoff between accuracy and delay in decision-making.