Managers' Trading Around Stock Repurchases
分析了管理者在要约回购前后个人公开市场交易行为，发现除荷兰式拍卖外，管理者在回购公告前会利用内幕信息优势调整持股，为研究内部人交易与回购信号提供了证据。
ABSTRACT We analyze personal open market trades by managers around stock repurchases by tender offer. With the exception of Dutch auction offers, managers trade their firm's shares prior to repurchase announcements as though repurchases convey favorable inside information to outsiders. Prior to fixed price repurchase offers that do not follow takeover‐related events, managers increase their buying and reduce their selling of their firm's shares. Prior to repurchases that follow takeover‐related events, only a decrease in selling is found. No abnormal trading precedes Dutch auction repurchase offers.