Contract, renegotiation, and holdup: Results on the technology of trade and investment
研究特定投资、非持久交易机会和重新谈判下的合同关系，区分投资与交易行动的统一与分离，分析非强制合同如何影响效率，对合同设计和投资激励有参考价值。
This paper examines a class of contractual relationships with specific investment, a non-durable trading opportunity, and renegotiation. Trade actions are modeled as individual and trade-action-based option contracts ("non-forcing contracts") are explored. The paper introduces the distinction between divided and unified investment and trade actions, and it shows the key role this distinction plays in determining whether efficient investment and trade can be achieved. Under a non-forcing dual-option contract, the party without the trade action is made residual claimant with regard to the investment action, which induces efficient investment in the divided case. The unified case is more problematic; here, efficiency is typically not attainable but the dual-option contract is still optimal in a wide class of settings. More generally, the paper shows that, with ex post renegotiation, constraining parties to use "forcing contracts" implies a strict reduction in the set of implementable value functions.