CEO Compensation, Change, and Corporate Strategy
研究绩效薪酬如何促使CEO追求过于激进、难以实施的战略，并分析股东在高变动环境中通过预先承诺高薪或低薪来抑制这种倾向的条件。
ABSTRACT CEO compensation can influence the kinds of strategies that firms adopt. We argue that performance‐related compensation creates an incentive to look for overly ambitious, hard to implement strategies. At a cost, shareholders can curb this tendency by precommitting to a regime of CEO overcompensation in highly changeable environments. Alternatively shareholders can commit to low CEO pay, although this requires a commitment mechanism (either by the board of the individual company, or by the society as a whole) to counter the incentive to renegotiate upwards. We study the conditions under which the different policies for CEO compensation are preferred by shareholders.