Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining
研究买卖双方均存在私人信息时的讨价还价博弈，发现卖方对买方估值的二阶信念会导致协议延迟，且当买方认为卖方可能知道其估值时延迟必然发生。
We study a one-sided offers bargaining game in which the buyer has private information about the value of the object and the seller has private information about his beliefs about the buyer's valuation. We show that this uncertainty about uncertainties dramatically changes the set of outcomes. In particular, second order beliefs can lead to a delay in reaching agreement even when the seller makes frequent offers. We show that not all types of second order beliefs lead to a delay. When the buyer assigns positive probability to the seller knowing the buyer's value, then delay not only can occur, but it must occur for a class of equilibria. However, in all other cases delay will never occur. Copyright The Econometric Society 2005.