The Role of Underwriter-Investor Relationships in the IPO Process
研究发现承销商在分配IPO股票时偏向与其有合作关系的机构投资者，这些常客投资者比临时投资者获得更多折价发行的股票，尤其在需求旺盛、流动性差或承销商声誉较低的情况下。
Abstract We find that in allocating initial public offerings (IPOs), underwriters favor institutions they have previously worked with. Regular investors benefit more than casual investors in IPOs through greater participation in underpriced issues. Relationship participation is more important in the distribution of IPOs with stronger demand, IPOs of less liquid firms, and deals by less reputable underwriters. Overall, our results are consistent with book-building theories of IPOs. Interestingly, for 1999–2000 we find that regular investors receive even more underpriced IPOs relative to previous years while we do not find evidence that they provide additional services in IPOs.