Externalities, Fixed Costs and Information
指出庇古和科斯的外部性解决方案回避了问题实质，论证外部性源于信息复杂性和高交易成本，并提出基于制度的应对方法。
The well-known theoretical solutions to the problem of externalities developed by Arthur C. Pigou and Ronald H. Coase--taxation according to measured preferences, bargaining under low transaction costs--have restated the problem of social cost, rather than addressed it: externalities exist where preferences are difficult to measure and transaction costs are high. Building on Kenneth J. Arrow's conjecture that the existence of externalities is equivalent to the nonexistence of markets, the article demonstrates that externalities are characterized by informational complexity and high transaction costs. As an appropriate response capable of addressing the complexity and the dynamic nature of externalities, institution-based approaches are presented. Copyright 1998 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG